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1A Bayesian Real Option Approach to Patents and Optimal Renewal Fees 
Marc Baudry * 
and 
Béatrice Dumont ** 
This article aims at estimating the optimal profile of renewal fees patent offices should implement. It is at the 
crossroad of two strands of literature. The first strand is the theoretical literature analysing renewal fees as an 
optimal revelation mechanism. The second strand is the econometric literature developing real option models of 
patent renewal decisions to assess the value of patents. Using data from the French patent office, we find that 
there is little room to lower the social cost of patents without affecting the monetary incentives to apply for a 
patent and innovate. We show that a menu of optimally defined profiles helps to further discriminate among 
patents. 
JEL Classification : O31, O34, O38 
Keywords : Patent Renewal, Renewal Fees, Real Option, Bayesian Learning 
1. Introduction 
Renewal fees are a common and important feature of the patent system in most 
countries. Indeed, through the payment of renewal fees, patent offices provide patentees with 
the entitlement to choose, subject to a maximum period
1
, the duration of protection actually 
granted to their inventions. However, one often notices a lack of interest of policy-makers in 
this facet of patent policy and a common but wrong wisdom that renewal fees play a limited 
role in the effectiveness of the patent system. An illustration of this lack of interest can be 
found in the diversity of patterns and frequencies of renewal fees charged by most patent 
offices. Looking first at the pattern of renewal fees, it is striking to note the lack of 
transparency with which renewal fees are set up. In France, for instance, after an experiment 
between 2001 and 2008 in which the profile of renewal fees was characterised by four stages, 
the patent office decided to re-implement the previous pattern which was more progressive 
but without giving any justification for such change. In the same way, in Italy, renewal fees 
were cancelled in 2006 and then re-introduced in 2007 again without explanation. In turn, 
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 Art. 33 of the TRIPS Agreement sets a minimum period of protection “the term of protection available 
shall not end before the expiration of a period of 20 years counted from the filing date” but this provision is 
often considered as the maximum period of protection. 
2renewal fees may consist of a basic fee or they may consist, like in Japan, of a basic fee plus a 
fee for each claim. As no extra service is provided at payment of the renewal fee to maintain a 
patent, one could argue that this may be the ultimate example of a levy or a tax. Lastly, 
frequencies of payment may also differ. Although in most European countries payment 
applies annually, in some countries renewal fees are payable less frequently. In the United 
States, for instance, payment is required at 3.5, 7.5 and 11.5 years after issue but force is to 
note that such payment is not tied to specific milestones in the patent life cycle. Obviously, 
the guidelines for setting renewal fees need to be clarified. Indeed, though they are essentially 
set at defraying the operational costs of patent offices and at subsidizing access to the patent 
system for SMEs, inconsistencies of the fees could be detrimental to the efficiency of the 
patent system
2
. 
Despite this apparent lack of interest, the justification of patent renewal mechanisms is 
well documented from a theoretical point of view in the economic literature. In their seminal 
articles, Scotchmer (1999) and Cornelli and Schankerman (1999) argue that renewal 
mechanisms work as optimal revelation mechanisms when a patent applicant has private 
information about his invention; information that is observed neither ex ante nor ex post by 
the patent office. However, little is said about the exact monetary values at which patent 
offices should set renewal fees. A reason for this is that theoretical works generally focus on 
ex ante heterogeneity among inventions (i.e. heterogeneity prior a patent is applied for), 
whereas heterogeneity arising ex post from the stochastic nature of the rent associated with a 
patent is disregarded. Cornelli and Schankerman (1999) or Gans, King and Lampe (2004) 
acknowledge that the stochastic dynamics of the rent plays a crucial role in practice but it is 
treated in a simplified way. 
From an empirical point of view, the importance of the stochastic dynamics of the rent 
has been stressed in the econometric literature. Among those econometric works that attempt 
to infer the value of patents from patents renewal decisions, the real option approach is 
probably the most convincing one. A key assumption of this approach is that, due to the 
stochastic dynamics of the rent, patent owners have imperfect but evolving information about 
the rent associated with their patents. As a result, the annual decision to renew a patent is 
assimilated to the exercise of a sequence of European type options; the exercise prices of 
which are the annual renewal fees whereas the stochastic rent is the underlying asset value. 
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 Rassenfosse & van Pottelsberghe (2008) estimate that fee policies adopted over the past three decades 
explain, to a significant extent, the rising propensity to patent. 
3Pakes (1986) has been the first to propose this approach and to subsequently develop an 
estimation method of patent value by using data on observed renewal decisions. More 
recently, Baudry and Dumont (2006) have used estimation results of a real option model of 
patent renewal decisions to simulate the impact of a change of renewal fees. However, these 
authors confine themselves to comparative simulations rather than to fully determine the 
optimal profile of renewal fees. A reason for this is that real option models of patent renewal 
decisions lack an explicit link between the value of the rent on the one hand and the social 
surplus on the other hand. 
Clearly, there is a need for a model at the crossing point of the two strands of literature, 
i.e. combining both an analysis of patent renewals as a revelation mechanism and the 
assessment of the value of patents on the basis of a real option model. This article aims at 
developing such a model and at estimating the optimal profile of renewal fees. Two additional 
points are also addressed by the article. Firstly, should a sole optimal profile of renewal fees 
be proposed to patent applicants or should patent applicants rather face a menu of profiles and 
freely choose among the proposed profiles? Secondly, are standard Markovian processes used 
in real option models relevant to capture uncertainty affecting the dynamics of future markets 
or, should rather these standard processes be adapted to account for Bayesian learning? These 
two additional points deserve some comments. 
Regarding the first point, i.e. whether similar rules should apply to all patents or not, it 
is considered as a recurrent debate in intellectual property. The “one size fits all” principle is 
emblematic of this debate. It refers to the standard statutory life limit of twenty years used by 
most countries to conform with TRIPS agreements. However, an important but often 
neglected characteristic of the patent system is that patents are self-screened through the 
renewal mechanism. In other words, if in theory the “one size fits all” system prevails, in 
practice a patent holder will decide whether to keep its patent in force or to let it fall into the 
public domain. This means that if patent applicants have perfect private information about the 
time path of the rent associated to their patents, then the renewal mechanism may be 
interpreted as a menu. More precisely, at the date of application, each applicant has to choose 
the duration of the patent on the one hand and the sum of renewal fees to be paid on the other 
hand among a set of proposed combinations. The renewal mechanism then discriminates ex 
ante between patents. Cornelli and Schankerman (1999) as well as Scotchmer (1999) are in 
line with this interpretation. Conversely, if applicants have no private information at the date 
of their patent application but learn about the value of the rent as time goes, then the renewal 
4mechanism does not discriminate ex ante among patents. Discrimination occurs ex post and is 
contingent to the time path of the rent. Gans, King and Lampe (2004) are in line with this 
view. In practice, patent applicants have private but incomplete information at the date of 
patent application, a situation this article deals with. For this purpose, we denote by “one 
profile fits all” (in analogy with the “one size fits all” rule) the case of a sole profile of 
renewal fees proposed to all patent applicants. By contrast, we denote by “tailor-made 
profiles” the case of a menu of differentiated profiles of renewal fees among which patent 
applicants have to choose at the date of application. To our knowledge, “tailor-made profiles” 
have not yet been proposed nor investigated in the economic literature. They are intended to 
act as a relevant indirect revelation mechanism when patent applicants have initially private 
and incomplete information but learn more about the value of the rent as time goes whereas it 
is impossible or too costly for the patent office to directly obtain the corresponding 
information. An econometric test of how much could be gained in terms of social welfare by 
implementing an optimal “tailor-made profiles” mechanism rather than a “one profile fits all” 
mechanism is proposed in this article. 
Regarding the second point, i.e. the question whether standard Markovian processes are 
relevant to capture the stochastic nature of the dynamics of the rent that accrues from a patent, 
it may look, at a first glance, rather technical. However, this question does have some 
economic background once some important assumptions underlying the use of standard 
Markovian processes in real option models are specified. To be more explicit, recall that the 
use of Markovian processes in real options is inspired by the practice of financial options. 
Financial options are derivatives, the underlying asset of which is exchanged on a market 
since a sufficiently long period. As a result, sufficiently long time series data are available to 
allow an estimation of the objective probability distribution of identically and independently 
random shocks affecting the dynamics of the underlying asset. One of the difficulties we are 
facing here is that the case of the rent associated with a patent does not fit into this context. 
By definition, a patent involves a new invention so that the dynamics of the rent depends on at 
least one parameter, the exact value of which is not known with certainty. Uncertainty about 
the value of the parameters that govern the dynamics of the rent is represented by a subjective 
probability distribution on the set of possible values. Noisy messages arise from the 
observation of short term dynamics of the rent and help revising the subjective probability 
distribution of unknown parameters. Accordingly, this learning process affects expectations 
about the future values of the rent. The economic literature generally deals with this type of 
uncertain dynamics in a Bayesian way. Though the importance of learning for the dynamic 
5analysis of patents is outlined by Pakes (1986), Cornelli and Schankerman (1999) or Gans, 
King and Lampe (2004), it has never been explicitly modelled in a Bayesian way
3
. Therefore, 
our article goes one step further and proposes an adaptation of the Bayesian treatment of 
learning to real options models of patent renewal decisions that mixes Bayesian and 
Markovian dynamics. 
The article is structured as follows. Part 2 introduces the model in a general setting. The 
focus is on obtaining a real option model that provides a realistic representation of patent 
renewal decisions and allows for social welfare considerations. Formal definitions of the “one 
profile fits all” and “tailor-made profiles” optimal mechanisms are proposed. The addition of 
a revenue-generating constraint for the patent office is also examined. Part 3 presents the 
econometric model. An extensive discussion of the modelling of the Bayesian dynamics of 
the rent is proposed. The probability distribution of the optimal date of patents withdrawal is 
then obtained and serves as a basis for estimating the model. Data from the French patent 
office covering the period 1970-2006 are used. Estimation results are presented in Part 4. 
They include an estimate of the social cost per patent compared to the monetary incentive to 
innovate measured by the option value per patent. We also estimate the optimal “one profile 
fits all” renewal fees and an optimal “tailor-made profiles” menu with two alternative choices. 
Social gains of the two systems are compared and the incidence of a self-financing constraint 
for the patent office is examined. In Part 5, concluding remarks summarise the key findings 
and suggestions for orienting patent offices’ practices are made. 
2. Definition of an optimal profile of patents renewal fees 
An optimal profile of patent renewal fees is a profile that maximises or minimises some 
objective function of the patent office. The case of a social welfare maximising patent office 
is more specifically of interest. However, the decision to apply for a patent and then, to keep it 
in force in order to deter competitors from freely copying the invention is under the control of 
the inventor. The most recent approach to the modelling of this decision is based on the real 
option theory. In Section 2.1, we adapt the real option approach to obtain a model of patent 
renewal decisions more specifically convenient for the analysis of choice of optimal renewal 
fees by the patent office. Two types of profiles are examined. The first type is the usual “one 
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 An exception is Crampes and Langinier (1998). These authors analyse strategic information disclosure 
in the renewal of patents with a Bayesian game between a patent holder and challengers but do not consider a 
learning process about the rent associated with the patent by the patent holder itself. 
6profile fits all” mechanism introduced in Section 2.2. The second type, presented in Section 
2.3, is a more complex menu of “tailor-made profiles” that act as an incentive mechanism. 
2.1. Patent renewal decisions as options 
A patent typically entitles its owner an exclusive right for a limited period to stop any 
third party from making, using, or selling the object of the patented invention without his 
permission. A common way to assess the value of a patent thus consists in defining its value 
as the additional discounted sum of monetary gains that accrue from this exclusive right. The 
existence of renewal fees that have to be paid to keep a patent in effect helps measuring the 
corresponding rent. Indeed, a sufficient condition for a patent to be renewed is that the annual 
rent exceeds the annual renewal fee. As a consequence, the decision to pay or not renewal 
fees conveys information about the value of the rent. This sufficient condition may also be a 
necessary condition when the time path of the rent is purely deterministic. Schankerman and 
Pakes (1986) have suggested an econometric method that builds on this property to estimate 
the distribution of the value of patent rights. If the time path of the rent is at least partly 
stochastic, it is no longer required that the annual rent exceeds the annual renewal fee for a 
patent to be profitably maintained. Indeed, as originally shown by Pakes (1986), the patent 
value then includes a speculative component and has to be defined as an option value. More 
precisely, a patent is assimilated to nested European call options with one year term, the total 
number of calls being fixed by the statutory life limit of patents. The underlying asset of these 
European call options is the patent’s rent whereas the annual renewal fees correspond to the 
exercise prices of the different calls.
Though the real option approach to patent renewal decisions has proved very useful to 
assess the value of patents, it is not directly suitable to determine a socially optimal profile of 
patent renewal fees. As already outlined in the introduction, a reason for this is that no explicit 
link is made in this approach between the value of the rent on the one hand and the surplus 
analysis on the other hand. Our article tries to fill this gap by assuming thereafter that each 
patent entitles its owner a monopolist position on the market for a new good resulting from 
the patented invention
4
. To keep things computationally tractable, it is more specifically 
assumed that each buyer of the new good has a linear inverse demand function qpp η−=
0
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 As in Cornelli and Schankerman (1986) our presentation focuses on the case of a product innovation 
rather than a process innovation. This distinction is not a problem as such as a new process can be licensed and 
thus generate revenues in the same manner as described in our model. 
7where p
0
 and η  are invariant parameters whereas p  and q  respectively denote the price of 
the new good and the quantity purchased by each buyer. The number of buyers of this new 
good is supposed to follow a stochastic process N t . Without loss of generality, the marginal 
cost of production of each new good is supposed to be zero. As a result, the monopoly rent 
received at time t  by a patent holder is given by 
( ) ( ) NpNR tt η420= (1.a) 
where N t  may be interpreted as a measure of market size. Meanwhile, the deadweight loss 
due to the monopoly position amounts to 
( ) ( ) NpNL tt η820= (1.b) 
In the absence of patent protection, the monopoly position of an inventor could be 
contested by competitors through reverse engineering for instance. In the case of a competitor 
succeeding in entering the market, the market structure is supposed to shift to a Bertrand-Nash 
price equilibrium and the inventor’s profit to vanish. The threat of entry is not explicitly 
formalised but captured by an exogenous probability λ  that the monopolist’s rent drops to 
zero. Though profits fall to zero because of entry, competitors are assumed to be interested in 
supplying the new good either because the good at stake can be used as a loss leader to boost 
the sales of other products or to lower the inventor’s financial resources. In a discrete time 
context, the value of an invention in the absence of a patent system and prior the entry of a 
first competitor is then given by 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
ρ
λ
t
tAt
ttA
NV
NRNV
+
Ε−
+= +
1
~1
1 (2) 
where Εt  stands for the mathematical expectation conditional on the information available at 
time t  and ρ t  is the interest rate at time t . Thereafter, a tilde above a variable is used to 
outline it is stochastic. The value function V A  is also the termination payoff of a patent owner 
when he decides not to renew his patent at time t . The alternative for the patent owner is to 
renew his patent for one more year by paying the renewal fee ct  in counterpart of the 
monopolist rent ( )NR t  with certainty at time t  plus the discounted expected value of the 
opportunity to renew the patent again at time 1+t . As long as a patent has not yet been 
withdrawn and before the statutory term limit T , the value V B  of the patented invention is 
given by the best alternative between renewing the patent for one more year and withdrawing 
the patent forever: 
8( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )

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(3.a) 
At the statutory term limit T , the patent owner no longer holds exclusive rights on the 
invention and it becomes available to commercial exploitation by others. This means that the 
patent owner only receives the monopolist rent ( )NR T  plus the continuation value associated 
with the end of exclusivity in counterpart of the renewal fee cT .  
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )






+
Ε
+−= + NV
NV
cNRMaxcTNV TA
T
TAT
TTTTB ,
1
~
,, 1
ρ
 (3.b) 
In accordance with the aim of the article to define an optimal profile of renewal fees, the 
value function V B  is explicitly expressed as a function of the sequence { }cc Tt ,,  of current 
and future renewal fees to be paid if the patent is renewed. Moreover, due to the existence of 
the statutory life limit T , the value function V B  also depends on time or, more precisely, on 
the time delay between the current date and the statutory life limit of the patent. The dynamic 
program (3) is solved backwards. The option value of the patent is the additional revenue 
generated by the legal protection compared with the absence of a patent system: 
( ) ( ) ( )NVcctNVcctNOV tATttBTtt −= ,,,,,,,,  . (4) 
Given that the patent has not been withdrawn at time t , the optimal date of withdrawal of the 
patent is the random stopping time defined as 
( ) { } ( ){ }ccNTtccN TTtt ,,,~;,,inf,,,~*  ττ τττ Ω∉∈=  (5) 
where ( )cc T,,, ττΩ  is the optimal waiting region. At each date τ , this region is defined as 
the set of values of the rent so that renewing the patent generates a higher value that 
withdrawing the patent: 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }NVccNVIRNcc ATBT >+∈=Ω ,,,,;,,,  ττ ττ  (6) 
Both the optimal stopping time and the option value are not only affected by the initial value 
of the rent but also by the entire sequence of renewal fees to be paid to keep the patent in 
effect. This is at the core of the definition of an optimal profile for renewal fees. 
92.2 The “one profile fits all” optimal renewal fees
Common wisdom holds that while a few patents are very valuable, the majority is 
worthless. This difference in terms of patent quality is accounted for in econometric works 
that attempt to assess the value of patents by assuming heterogeneity as regards the initial rent 
that accrues from a patent at the date it is granted. By contrast, most existing patent renewal 
systems are based on a “one profile fits all” mechanism of renewal fees
5
. The main feature of 
such a profile is that it discriminates ex post between patents but not ex ante. Indeed, all 
patents face the same profile of renewal fees at the date they are granted but, depending on the 
bad or good fortune of the patented invention, they are withdrawn more or less early so that 
the total amount of renewal fees effectively paid substantially varies across patents. In such a 
context, an optimal profile of renewal fees may be broadly defined as a fixed sequence of 
renewal fees that balances the social cost of patents on the one hand and the incentives to 
innovate they generate on the other hand. A comprehensive characterisation of an optimal 
profile would thus require analysing how the decision to invest in R&D is affected by the 
option value of a patent which, in turn, depends on the renewal fees sequence. This analysis is 
beyond the scope of this article. The focus is rather made on the characterisation of a second-
best optimal profile in the sense that it minimises the social cost implied by a patent with the 
constraint to provide a monetary incentive to innovate that amounts at least to an exogenously 
given value. 
The social cost of a patent is defined recursively. When the patent has been withdrawn 
and a competitor has entered the market, the social cost amounts to zero because the market 
structure shift to a Bertrand-Nash price equilibrium. When the patent has been withdrawn but 
no competitor has yet entered the market, the social cost is given by the following value 
function, the expression of which is close to (2): 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
ρ
λ
t
tAt
ttA
NW
NLNW
+
Ε−
+= +
1
~1
1 (7.a) 
Indeed, the current deadweight loss is incurred but there is a probability λ  that it vanishes 
forever at the next date and a probability λ−1  that it lasts. As long as the patent has not yet 
been withdrawn, the social cost is finally given by
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 The Japanese system based on a basic fee plus a per claim fee is a noticeable exception. 
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Expression (6) makes it explicit that the social cost of a patent depends on the renewal 
decision of the patent owner. Formally, the optimal profile is thus determined as the outcome 
of a Stackelberg game with an additional constraint. The patent office is assimilated to the 
leader and chooses the sequence of renewal fees that minimises the expected discounted sum 
of deadweight loss induced per a patent where expectation is computed at the date of 
application. For this purpose, the patent office needs to take into account the reaction function 
of patent holders as regards their decision to renew or not their patents. The optimal stopping 
time defined in (5) yields the reaction function for a patent holder facing the initial market 
size N 0  at the date of application. Though patents are assumed to be heterogeneous in terms 
of the initial market size N 0 , the patent office does not discriminate among patents according 
to this variable. Instead, its aim is to implement the optimal “one profile fits all” system of 
renewal fess that minimises the expected discounted sum of deadweight losses where 
expectation is taken over all possible values of N 0 . But, in doing so, the patent office tries to 
maintain the monetary incentive to innovate generated by the patent system at least equal to 
an exogenous level V . The expected option value of a patent, where expectation is taken over 
the set of possible values of N 0 , measures the monetary incentive to innovate provided by the 
patent system when there is no prior information about the initial market size N 0 . The 
optimal profile then solves the following optimisation program 
{ } ( )[ ]ccNWEMincc TBT
,,,0,~
,,
00
0


. (8.a) 
Subject to 
( )[ ] VccNV TB ≥Ε ,,,0,~ 00  (8.b) 
If 0=V , then constraint (8.b) may be interpreted as a participation constraint in the sense 
that, prior any information about the initial market size, an innovator anticipates he will apply 
for a patent. If V  amounts to the actual expected option value of patents, then constraint (8.b) 
is aimed at making sure the optimal profile is Pareto-improving compared with the actual 
situation. 
11
At this stage, it is important to take into account the fact that the revenue-generating 
pressures on patent offices can lead to changes in the social benefits of the patent system. As 
shown by Gans, King and Lampe (2004), a socially optimal structure of renewal fees would 
encourage the maximal number of applications while reducing effective patent length. 
However, when patent offices are required to be self-funding, resources constraints can distort 
the fee structure. However, these authors consider a simplified two-period model where the 
fee structure is limited to an application fee at the first period and a single renewal fee at the 
second period. Imposing a revenue-generating requirement in the optimisation model (8) is 
straightforward. If F  denotes the per patent average cost incurred by the patent office, then 
the self-funding constraint is given by 
( )[ ] FccNF T ≥Ε ,,,0,~ 00  (9.a) 
where expectation is taken over all possible values of the initial market size N 0 . The value 
function F  is defined iteratively as follows 
( )
( )[ ]
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(9.b) 
Expression (9.b) yields the discounted sum of renewal fees that is expected at time t  from a 
patent associated with a current market size N t . 
2.3. “Tailor-made optimal profiles” as an incentive mechanism 
A key assumption underlying the “one profile fits all” definition of an optimal profile of 
renewal fees is that an innovator applies for patent without having any knowledge about the 
state of nature. In reality, it is doubtful that an inventor does not have prior information about 
the initial market size associated with his patented invention, notably because divergence in 
industry perspectives on the values and uses of patents has been documented by large-scale 
R&D surveys conducted over several decades. Moreover, patent applicants also have private 
information about how much money has been spend to develop an innovation and whether it 
may be considered as a drastic innovation or an incremental innovation, a feature that clearly 
influences the magnitude of demand which again is different across sectors. This means that 
12
the present “unitary” patent system is limited in its ability to account for the ways that patents 
are used and viewed in different sectors. But most importantly, this also means that it is not 
efficient for a social surplus maximising patent office to adopt a “one profile fits all” system 
when patent owners have private information. Instead, as shown by Cornelli and 
Schankerman (1999) and Scotchmer (1999), the patent office should rather try to design a 
renewal mechanism that aims at optimally screening patents. However, most of theoretical 
works that deal with such screening mechanisms disregard the stochastic nature of the 
dynamics of the rent associated to a patent. Stated another way, they consider that a patent 
owner is fully informed about the characteristics of his patent. The real option approach to 
patent renewal decisions allows a more realistic setting where a patent owner is only partially 
informed about the characteristics of the patent. Information is partial in the sense that the 
initial market size N 0  is known by the patent holder but not its exact future time path. The 
option to renew or not the patent is precisely aimed at introducing some flexibility in 
counterpart of this uncertainty. Because the role of uncertainty as regards the future values of 
the rent diminishes as the patent get closer to the statutory term limit, intuition suggests that 
renewal fees should vary with the age of the patent. Hence, what we try to determinate is a 
menu of renewal fees profiles in which an innovator will select a profile given the partial 
private information at his disposal at the date of his patent application. 
For the sake of simplicity, the optimal design of a menu of renewal fees profiles is 
developed in the context of a discrete distribution of the initial market size N 0  over a finite 
set of I  possible values. The probability of each possible value N i0  ( { }Ii ,,1 ∈ ) of the 
market size is denoted by [ ]Npr i0 . The patent office is still assumed to minimise the expected 
social cost of a patent where expectation is taken over all possible values N i0  ( { }Ii ,,1 ∈ ) 
of the initial market size because the state of nature is a private information and is not known 
by the patent office. By doing so, the patent office now faces I  participation constraints or 
Pareto improvement constraints. Each of these constraints is similar to (8.b) except that the 
expected values on the left hand side and right hand side are replaced by exact realisations for 
each possible value of N 0 . Last but not least, incentive compatibility constraints have to be 
added. The optimal “tailor-made profiles” are thus obtained as the solution of the following 
optimisation program: 
{ } [ ] ( )=
I
i
i
T
ii
B
i
I
T
I
T
ccNWNprMin
cccc 1
000
0
11
0
,,,0,
,,,,,,


. (10.a) 
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Subject to 
( ) IiVccNV iiTiiB ,,1,,,0, 00  =∀≥  (10.b) 
( ) ( ) IjIiccNVccNV jTjiBiTiiB ,,1and,,1,,,0,,,,0, 0000  =∀=∀≥  (10.c) 
Constraints of type (10.b) are participation constraints (if 0=V
i ) or Pareto improvement 
constraints (if V
i  is the current option value for patents of type i ). Constraints of type (10.c) 
are incentive compatibility constraints. When patent offices are required to be self-funding, 
then the additional constraint reads 
[ ] ( ) FccNFNprI
i
T
ii ≥

=1
000 ,,,0,  (11) 
This additional constraint does not depart from (9) because, as assumed by Gans, King and 
Lampe (2004), the administrative cost of a patent is considered as fixed, regardless the type of 
the patent. 
3. The econometric model 
So far, the concepts and definitions of the optimal “one profile fits all” and “tailor-made 
profiles” of renewal fees have been introduced in a rather general setting. More specifically, 
no assumption has been made about the exact form of the stochastic process used to describe 
the dynamics of the market size. However, such assumptions are necessary to proceed with an 
econometric application. As a result, Section 3.1 first introduces the stochastic process of the 
market size. Short term shocks affecting the dynamics of the market size are treated as 
informative messages (though noisy) that convey information about key parameters of the 
long term dynamics. Therefore, an emphasis is made on Bayesian learning about long term 
tendencies of the market size. Probability distributions of interest from an econometric point 
of view are then derived and presented in Section 3.2. Firstly, the probability distribution of 
future values of the market size conditional on the observed current market size is derived 
from the stochastic process defined in Section 3.1. Secondly, the probability distribution of 
optimal stopping times, conditional on the sequence of renewal fees, is obtained. This 
probability distribution is at the core of the econometric method presented in section 3.3 for 
the estimation of the parameters involved in the model. 
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3.1. Bayesian learning and market size dynamics 
A key idea in the analysis of patent renewals due to Pakes (1986) is that holding a 
patent is a bet on future but uncertain revenues. Accordingly, the dynamics of the associated 
rent is supposed to follow a Markovian stochastic process. Such a representation of the 
dynamics of the rent mimics the representation usually used for most financial or real assets. 
Markovian processes rely on the assumption that there exist identically and independently 
distributed random shocks that affect the evolution of the rent associated to a patent. 
Therefore, Markovian processes are adapted to the representation of risk affecting the 
dynamics of the rent but disregard a fundamental feature of the real option problem at stake 
here, namely uncertainty. Uncertainty does not refer to a situation where the value of the 
underlying asset changes as time goes but to a situation where the knowledge that economic 
agents have of this value changes with information over time. As information is often noisy, 
time is needed for a patent owner to learn about the correct value of the rent and to obtain a 
more accurate knowledge of it. The evolution of knowledge is represented by changes in 
subjective probabilities associated to each possible value of the rent. These changes obey 
Bayes’ theorem so that the dynamics underlying the option problem departs from more 
standard Markovian processes and the resulting real option problem may be referred to as a 
Bayesian real option problem by contrast with the usual Markovian real option problems 
extensively treated in the literature (see e.g. Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). 
The model of patent renewal choice developed in this article actually mixes Bayesian 
and Markovian dynamics
6
. Uncertainty affects the long term value N LT  of market size and, as 
a consequence, the long term value of the rent. Though the correct value of long term market 
size is invariant, it is not directly observed. The simple model considered here involves two 
possible long term market sizes denoted by N LT
max  and N LT
min  with NN LTLT
maxmin < . The two 
corresponding scenarios are respectively referred to as the optimistic scenario ( NN LTLT
max
= ) 
and the pessimistic scenario ( NN LTLT
min
= ). The short term or observed market size N t  at time 
t  is a discrete time stochastic process, the evolution of which is partly governed by the long 
term market size. We use the broad class of discrete time stochastic processes proposed by 
Baudry and Dumont (2006) to represent the link between short term and long term market 
sizes. Following Baudry and Dumont (2006), we assume that the time unit is one year and 
                                                
6
 Mixes of Markovian and Bayesian processes have already been used to analyse the optimal allocation of 
time between activities with uncertain returns in a continuous time approach (Bolton and Harris, 1999; 
Moscarini and Smith, 2001). Kelly and Kolstad (1999) used a discrete time equivalent of these mix processes in 
their study of optimal investment strategies to curve global warming. 
15
divide each annual period [ ]1, +tt  in M  subintervals of equal length Mt 1=∆ . The 
dynamics of the short term market size is then defined by 
( )eNN hZtttt ∆−∆∆+ = 12 (12.a) 
with 
NN
p
p
Z LTLT
t
t
t
max
max
max
if
1yprobabilitwith 0
yprobabilitwith 1
=



−
=∆  (12.b) 
NN
p
p
Z LTLT
t
t
t
min
min
min
if
1yprobabilitwith 0
yprobabilitwith 1
=



−
=∆  (12.c) 
and 
( )( )( )NNp tt maxmax exp11 −++= βα (12.d) ( )( )( )NNp tt minmin exp11 −++= βα (12.e) 
h∆ , N max  and N min  are positive parameters whereas α  is a real parameter without 
predefined sign. The expected sign of β  will be discussed latter on. The functional form used 
in (12.d) and (12.e) satisfies three important properties. Firstly, it is consistent with the 
description of a probability. Indeed, the values of pt
max
 and pt
min
 range between zero and one 
whatever the value of parameters and the value of the short term market size. Secondly, the 
likelihood of a positive shock (i.e. the probability that 1=∆Z t ) on the short term market size 
is higher (respectively lower) than the likelihood of a negative shock (i.e. the probability that 
0=∆Z t ) if and only if ( ) 0>−+ NN tβα  (respectively ( ) 0<−+ NN tβα ) with NN = max
or NN
min
= . The additional constraint 0>β  implies that the stochastic process described in 
(12) may be thought of as a mean reverting process with reversion to ( )βα−N max  or 
( )βα−N min , depending on the correct scenario. In this sense, the long term market sizes 
associated to each scenario are respectively given by ( )βα−= NN LT maxmax  and 
( )βα−= NN LT minmin . The gap between the short term and the long term market sizes then 
clearly influences the dynamics of the short term market size. If 0=β , then the dynamic 
process described in (12) resumes to a basic random walk and the distinction between the two 
scenarios no longer matters
7
. Thirdly, as long as 0>β , the likelihood of a positive shock on 
                                                
7
 Conversely, the case where 0<β  does not have much sense. It corresponds to what could be called a 
“mean repulsing” process (by analogy with the well known “mean reverting” process) with N LT
max
 and N LT
min
 as 
repulsing values of the short term market size. 
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the short term market size is always higher when the correct scenario is the optimistic one (i.e. 
NN LTLT
max
= ) rather than the pessimistic one (i.e. NN LTLT
min
= ). An important consequence of 
this third property is that shocks affecting the dynamics of the observed short term market size 
are noisy messages that convey information about the unobserved long term market size. This 
is a key element of the learning process. 
A patent owner is supposed to have beliefs about what is the correct value of the long 
term market size only. Thereafter, we denote by X t  (respectively X t−1 ) the subjective 
probability attributed by the patent owner at time t  that the correct scenario is the optimistic 
(respectively pessimistic) one. In order to reflect the absence of prior information at the initial 
time 0=t  we set 210 =X . Subjective probabilities are revised by implementing Bayes’ 
theorem to the noisy information provided by the observation of the random shocks affecting 
the short term market size on each subinterval of length t∆ . Using (12.b) (12.c) and Bayes’ 
theorem more specifically yields 
( )





=∆−
=∆
=
=∆
=∆
∆+
0ifPr1
1ifPr
0max
1max
ZpX
ZpX
X
t
Z
X ttt
t
Z
X ttt
tt  (13.a) 
where 
( ) pXpX ttttZX t minmax1 1Pr −+==∆ (13.b) 
( ) ( )( )pXpX ttttZX t minmax0 111Pr −−+−==∆ (13.c) 
are the unconditional probabilities of observing respectively a positive and a negative shock 
given the sole beliefs at time t  and without full information as regards the correct scenario. 
3.2. Probability distribution of shocks and optimal stopping times 
All value functions in (2), (3), (7) and (9) involve mathematical expectations of future 
market size for which computation is not straightforward. Indeed, a distinctive feature of the 
stochastic process described in (13) compared to usual discrete time stochastic processes is 
that the probabilities of positive and negative shocks are themselves functions of the 
stochastic process. This difference apart, the usual tree form representation (Cox, Ross and 
Rubinstein, 1979) displayed in Figure 1 and used for the analysis of discrete time options 
applies to the dynamics of the number of positive shocks observed from time t  until time 
tKt ∆+ . 
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Insert Figure 1
Let define [ ]kZtKt tt = ∆∆+=τ τPr  as the probability of observing k  ( { }Kk ,,0 ∈ ) 
additional positive shocks forwards on K  subintervals of length t∆  given the number Z t  of 
positive shocks already observed at time t . This probability is computed backwards with the 
following iterative formula 
[ ] { }





=Π
−∈Π
=Π
==
 ∆∆+=
0if
1,,1if
if
Pr
0 k
Kk
Kk
kZ k
K
tKt
tt τ τ  (14.a) 
with 
( )[ ] ( )Pr1Pr 1 11 =∆ ∆−+∆−+= −= ∆=Π ZX tKttKt ttK KZτ τ  (14.b) 
( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] ( )PrPrPr1Pr 0 111 11 =∆ ∆−+∆−+==∆ ∆−+∆−+= = ∆+−= ∆=Π ZX tKttKt ttZX tKttKt ttt kZkZ τ ττ τ  (14.c) 
( )[ ] ( )Pr0Pr 0 110 =∆ ∆−+∆−+= = ∆=Π ZX tKttKt tt Zτ τ (14.d) 
Figure 1 illustrates formula (14.c). Observing two positive shocks on three subintervals 
of length t∆  (i.e. observing 23 =
 ∆∆+= tt t Zτ τ ) arises as the outcome of two mutually exclusive 
events. The first event is a positive shock on the subinterval [ ]tttt ∆+∆+ 3,2  from a 
situation with 12 =
 ∆∆+= tt t Zτ τ . The probability of this event is thus Pr 12
=∆
∆+
Z
X tt
 times the 
probability of 12 =
 ∆∆+= tt t Zτ τ . The second event is a negative shock on the subinterval 
[ ]tttt ∆+∆+ 3,2  from a situation with 22 =
 ∆∆+= tt t Zτ τ . The probability of this event is 
Pr
0
2
=∆
∆+
Z
X tt
 times the probability of 22 =
 ∆∆+= tt t Zτ τ . The probability of observing 23 = ∆∆+= tt t Zτ τ
is then obtained as the sum of these two events. Combined with expressions (12) and (13) 
defining the dynamics of market size and the dynamics of beliefs, the iterative formula (14) is 
more specifically of interest to compute the mathematical expectations characterising the 
value functions defined in (2), (3), (7) and (9) and solve the real option problem. In turn, as 
outlined by (5) and (6), the value functions defined in (2) and (3) directly affect the 
probability distribution of optimal stopping time. 
We follow the method proposed by Baudry and Dumont (2006) for computing the exact 
probability distribution of optimal stopping times in a discrete time real option model of 
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patent renewal decisions. Firstly, note that according to (12.a), the variation of the market size 
N t  from time t  until time tKt ∆+  only depends on the sum of positive shocks observed 
between the two dates. As a consequence, the market size N t  at time t  may be expressed as a 
function ( )ZN t  of the total number  ∆= =tt ZZ 0τ τ  of positive shocks observed between the 
initial date 0=t  and the current date. This property also induces that the optimal waiting 
region in (6) may be defined indifferently in terms of market size N t  or in terms of total 
number Z t  of positive shocks. Secondly, the following indicator variable is defined: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )



Ω∉
Ω∈
=
cctZN
cctZN
II
Ttt
Ttt
t
,,,if0
,,,if1


(15) 
where ( )cct Tt ,,, Ω  is the optimal waiting region defined in (6). Subscript t  is used to 
stress that II t  depends on all the variables that appear in the left hand side of (15), and more 
specifically on Z t . Thirdly, we denote by Φ −stt  the probability of the event “the patent is 
renewed up to date t ” conditional on the information available at date st −  (i.e. conditional 
on the sum of observed positive shocks Z st− , on the current date st −  and on the sequence of 
renewal fees cc Tst ,,− ). This probability is defined recursively as follows (See Baudry and 
Dumont, 2006): 
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 (16) 
M  is the number of shocks, either positive or negative, between two renewal dates. The 
probability distribution of the optimal stopping time (i.e. the optimal date of withdrawal of a 
patent) is then given by: 
( )[ ]

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


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≤<Φ−Φ
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−
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3.3. Data and estimation method
We use in this article data on French patent renewals for the period 1970-2006, broken 
down by patent application date (cohort)
8
. Our panel is balanced for about 16 cohorts (1970-
1986). For each cohort, the data include the number of patent applications, whatever the 
nationality of the patentee and the number of patent renewals at each available age
9
. 
Unfortunately, no information was available either on individual patents or on the breakdown 
of cohorts by technology field or type of patent. 
Renewal fee schedules in France are published in the Official Journal and were changed 
frequently during the sample period but most recent schedules apply to all patents regardless 
of the year in which the patent has been applied for. Renewal fees start at very low levels and 
rise monotonically as the patent ages (Cf. Figure 2). Since 2008, the French patent office 
(INPI) is using a renewal fee structure that is more progressive after seven years of 
experiment in which the profile of the renewal fees was characterised by four stages. For the 
needs of the article, these nominal renewal fees obtained in nominal domestic currency were 
converted to real costs by using the country’s own implicit GDP deflator and then converted 
into euros. 
Insert Figure 2
Looking now at patent renewals, one notices (Figure 3) that, contrary to all 
expectations, many patents are dropped out even for a small amount of renewal fees. Thus, 
more than 50% of the patents granted by the French patent office were dropped before the age 
of eight years and only 25% were maintained over the age of thirteen. Given the relatively 
low renewal fees, this clearly indicates a concentration of low-value patents. Two phenomena 
can lead to such a proportion of drop-out (mortality rate): 
 The first is technical. Every patent application will not automatically give rise to a 
patent grant. The patent office may refuse to grant a patent following the patent review 
                                                
8
 Data for the interest rate have been collected on the website of the French Finance Ministry. They 
correspond to the legal interest rate calculated as a moving average of French treasury bills rates. The 
corresponding values have been deflated by the national consumer price index. 
9
 We thank Dominique Deberdt from INPI who provided us with data. 
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process by considering that the innovation at stake does not fulfil the criteria of 
patentability
10
.  
 The second is more of an economic nature. Failure to pay renewal fees results in an 
automatic lapse of the patent. 
Another important aspect underlined by Figure 3 is a tendency of decline in the 
frequencies of drop out by age (from around 8% in the first periods to 2% at the end of the 
patent life). The last value represents the percentage of patents renewed to the statutory 
maximum, i.e. approximately 8% in average with a drop to 6-7% for some cohorts. At this 
stage, it is important to take two aspects into consideration: first of all, a patent grant enters 
into force most of the time 24 to 48 months after a patent application. This means that the 
frequencies for the first four years encompass a component which is independent from the 
willingness of the patentee and which, in turn, may also explain the artificially high 
proportions of drop outs over this period. Secondly, it is worth noting that the proportion of 
renewals sensibly varies according to the cohort taken into consideration. 
Insert Figure 3
Because patent withdrawals may result either from a rejection of the application or from 
a voluntary decision by the applicant, the real option model developed in part 2 has to be 
slightly modified. More precisely, the value function of an invention for which a patent is 
pending is given by 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }NVcctNHNVMaxcctNV tATttttAtTttB ,,,,,1,,,,  θθ −+=  (18.a) 
with 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
ρ t
TttBt
ttTtt
cctNV
cNRcctNH
+
+Ε
+−= ++
1
,,,1,~
,,,,
11

  (18.b) 
This value function is obtained by introducing the probability θ t  of rejection of the 
application at age t  in the value function (3.a) characterising a granted patent. We do not have 
                                                
10
 i.e. the criteria of novelty, inventiveness and industrial application in Europe. 
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detailed data on patent rejections by age but only aggregate data on patent rejections per 
cohort. For each cohort, the average rate of patent applications that are rejected by the patent 
office amounts to about 30%. This rate approximately corresponds to the sum of observed 
average frequencies of withdrawals for the first fourth ages (see Figure 2). This is consistent 
with the maximum delay of examination of about four years observed for a patent application 
to be accepted or rejected. Therefore, we assume that the average frequencies of withdrawal 
during the first fourth years correctly approximate the probability of rejection and set 
105.01 =θ , 083.02 =θ , 063.03 =θ , 064.04 =θ  and 0=θ t for all 4>t . Expression (18) is 
used in place of (3.a) to compute the probability distribution (17) of the optimal stopping 
time. Finally, the unconditional probability for a patent to be withdrawn at date t  on a 
voluntary basis or because of rejection is 
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 (19) 
The probability of observing for cohort i  some values n it  ( 1,,1 += Tt  ) of the theoretical 
number N it  of withdrawals at age t  can be written as 
[ ] ( )ccN nNnNnN Twt itT
t
iiii ,,,Pr,,Pr 00
1
1
01111  Π
+
=
===  (20) 
This probability depends on observed renewal fees and is conditional on the unobserved 
initial market size N 0 . Therefore, a probability distribution has to be defined for N 0 . A 
discrete approximation of the log normal distribution has been chosen. A first reason for this 
choice is that, compared to continuous probability distributions, it has the advantage of not 
requiring time consuming simulation methods to compute the likelihood of observed 
withdrawal frequencies. An exact computation of this likelihood is possible instead. A second 
reason is that a discrete probability distribution for N 0  implies a finite number of alternative 
classes of patents and thus simplifies the computation of an optimal revelation mechanism. A 
discrete approximation of the log normal probability distribution has been obtained by 
dividing the range of values between 0 and the 995
th
 quantile in intervals of equal length and 
affecting the corresponding density f m  to the middle N
m
0  of each interval. The likelihood of 
observed numbers n it  ( 1,,1 += Tt  ) of withdrawals at the different age for cohort i  if then 
given by 
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The treatment of renewal fees also deserves some comments. Indeed, as already outlined, 
changes of values for renewal fees are frequent and apply to all patents regardless of the date 
of application. Nevertheless, it does not seem possible to correctly forecast the date and 
magnitude of adjustments of patent renewal fees. Therefore, these changes have been dealt 
with by assuming that patent holders adjust instantaneously their decisions on the basis of 
current renewal fees rather than on expected future renewal fees. 
4. Results 
A major interest of the model developed in this paper is the contrast between its 
relatively low data requirement and the importance of numerical results that may be inferred 
from. Data on patent renewal frequencies by age and cohort are available in most developed 
countries. They have been extensively used to assess the value of patents, including on the 
basis of real option models of patent renewal decisions but, to our knowledge, they have never 
been used to assess the social cost imposed to consumers by the patent system. An immediate 
contribution of this part is to provide with estimates of not only parameters involved in the 
model but also estimates of the option value of patents, the social cost of patents and the 
revenues they generate for the patent office (section 4.1). Besides this first contribution, 
estimation results are also used to determine what the optimal “one profile fits all” renewal 
fees look like and examine implications in terms of social cost for consumers and revenues for 
the patent office (section 4.2)
11
. We finally give some insights about the interest and limits of 
a menu of optimal “tailor-made profiles” for renewal fees (section 4.3). 
4.1. Estimation results 
Given values of all parameters in the model, the exact value of the total likelihood of 
withdrawal obtained for cohorts 1970 to 2006 may be computed
12
. However, we are not able 
to find the analytical expression of the log-likelihood function. Following Pakes [1986] and 
Baudry and Dumont [2006], a numerical method has therefore been used. The steepest 
                                                
11
 Social effects are mainly characterised at two levels: at the level of the efficiency of the technical 
progress in the industry and at the level of the social surplus. Only the second aspect is studied here. 
12
 The number of shocks per year has been set to 4=M . 
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gradient method has been retained to maximise the likelihood
13
. Estimation results are 
displayed in Table 1. h∆ , α  and β  are parameters involved in expression (12) defining the 
dynamics of the rent. λ  is the probability of entry of competitors in the absence of a patent 
introduced in (2). According to expressions (1.a) and (1.b), both the rent that accrues to the 
patent holder and the corresponding deadweight loss are linear functions of the expression 
ηNp t20  which captures the state of demand for the new product. As a result, we do not need 
to distinguish between the different components of this expression and directly denote it S t . 
The dynamics of the rent and the deadweight loss are directly expressed in terms of S t  and all 
value functions as well. A discrete approximation of the log-normal probability distribution is 
assumed for S0  to capture heterogeneity between patents as regards initial conditions. 
0
Sµ
and σ S0  stand for the expected value and standard deviation of this distribution. Ten threshold 
values, associated with eleven intervals of equal length, between 0 and the 995
th
 quantile of 
S0  have been used to obtain the discrete approximation. Due to the heterogeneity between 
patents as regards their initial conditions, it is easier to define N
max  and N
min , or equivalently 
S
max  and S
min , in (12.d) and (12.e) as ( )δ max0 1+N  and ( )δ min0 1−N  respectively where δ max
and δ min  are two parameters to be estimated. The expected option value and social cost of a 
patent are also reported in Table 1. The significance of estimated parameters is tested on the 
basis of log-likelihood ratios rather than usual t-statistics. The reason for this is that, as 
already outlined by Pakes [1986] and Baudry and Dumont [2006], implementing numerical 
methods to maximise the likelihood of real option models of patent renewal decisions yields 
excessively high standard deviations of estimated coefficients. Moreover, the null hypothesis 
retained to implement the log-likelihood ratio test is a restriction of the estimated coefficient 
to half its value rather than to zero. Indeed, setting coefficients to zero does not have much 
sense in the model for most of the parameters and may lead to a null likelihood due to some 
frequencies of withdrawal that subsequently amount to zero. 
Insert Table 1
All estimated coefficients are highly significant. Moreover, the assumption that 
coefficients β , δ min  and δ max  are simultaneously significantly different from half their 
                                                
13
 The steepest gradient method has actually first been implemented to minimise the mean square error of 
withdrawal frequencies. Results for this first estimation have then been used as initial values to maximise the 
likelihood. Indeed, a shortcoming of the maximum likelihood estimation method for real option models of patent 
renewal decisions is that the likelihood amounts to zero as long as at least one estimated frequency is equal to 
zero, a case which often appears with arbitrary values of parameters. 
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estimated value, and thus significantly different from zero, is strongly rejected. The log-
likelihood ratio statistic associated to the test amounts to 25325.09, which is higher than all 
conventional threshold values for the khi-square statistic with three degrees of liberty. We 
conclude that the stochastic process for the rent cannot be reduced to a simple random walk 
and that Bayesian learning about the long term market size actually takes place. From a policy 
point of view, it is particularly of interest to note that the estimated expected social cost of a 
patent reported in Table 1 is more that ten times the estimated value of the expected option 
value of a patent. The burden of the charge borne by society to give monetary incentives to 
private inventors to patent their inventions and diffuse knowledge is thus quite consequent. It 
is not compensated by revenues collected by the patent office through renewal fees paid by 
patent holders. Indeed, these revenues per patent are estimated to amount to one tenth of the 
option value. These results make it urgent to reflect upon the question of whether the gains to 
society in terms of promotion of innovation through intellectual property are sufficiently high 
to justify such a social cost. 
A convenient way to assess the global quality of the regression consists in plotting 
observed and predicted frequencies of withdrawals. This is done in Figure 4 for all cohorts 
and in Figure 5 for the cohort 1986 which is the last cohort in our database for which 
withdrawals are observed for all ages. In both cases, the general shape of withdrawal 
frequencies is correctly predicted. Average frequencies over all cohorts are slightly 
overestimated at middle ages of patents whereas they are slightly underestimated at the last 
ages. This tendency does not appear when examining predicted frequencies for the cohort 
1986. For this cohort, the ratio of patents that are renewed until the legal limit is almost 
perfectly predicted. Interestingly, Figure 5 suggests that error predictions are not 
systematically higher when examined for a specific cohort rather than across all cohorts. 
Insert Figure 4
Insert Figure 5
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4.2. Estimation of the optimal “one profile fits all” renewal fees 
Recent adjustments of renewal fees reveal that the French patent office is looking for a 
way to improve the system without apparently having a clear guideline to define its policy. 
The theoretical framework proposed in Part 2 offers such a guideline. The Pareto improving 
version of the optimal “one profile fits all” system defined in (8) more specifically allows the 
determination of alternative renewal fees that lower the social cost of patents without 
deterring innovation compared with the current profile. For this purpose, we need to solve 
program (8) where all coefficients in value functions are set at their estimated value and V  is 
given by the estimated current option value of a patent. However, because we do not have 
analytical expressions for the value functions involved in program (8), a numerical 
approximation of these functions is required. For this purpose, we limit the degrees of liberty 
for the general shape of profiles by focussing on those profiles with a constant rate of growth 
or decay denoted by γ . It is more specifically convenient for graphical purposes to express 
this rate of growth or decay as a function of the initial and final renewal fees (respectively c0
and cT ). We thus consider profiles of the form 
( )γ+= 10 tcct  with ( ) 1
0
1
−=
c
cT Tγ  (22) 
As a result, value functions involved in program (8) only depend on c0  and cT  and the 
minimisation problem is solved only with respect to these two renewal fees. We do not 
impose that renewal fees increase with the age of a patent as currently observed (i.e. that 
cc T<0 ) but rather try to determine whether such a shape is optimal or not. Therefore we 
numerically approximate the value functions for cases with either cc T<0  (i.e. increasing 
profiles) or cc T>0  (i.e. decreasing profiles) but also cases with constant renewal fees. Cases 
with an annual subsidy to maintain the patent instead of an annual renewal fee are ruled out so 
that we only consider positive values for c0  and cT . More precisely, we use a lower bond of 
1€ for c0  and cT  because setting one of these two parameters to zero in (22) induces that all 
renewal fees also amount to zero so that patents are granted for free. 
Insert Figure 6
Insert Figure 7
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Insert Figure 8
Figures 6 and 7 display the expected social cost and the expected option value of a 
patent as functions of the initial and final renewal fees. A striking property of the two 
functions is that they co-vary. More precisely, both the expected social cost and the option 
value of a patent decrease with respect to the initial and final renewal fees. Though rather 
intuitive, this property implies that standard second order conditions for a solution of the 
constrained minimisation problem to be obtained as a solution of the first order conditions are 
not fulfilled. A corner solution is rather expected
14
. This is confirmed by Figure 8. The 
optimal solution is obtained at 10 =c  Euro and 07.3695=cT  Euros. As shown by Figure 9.a, 
compared to the current profile, the corresponding optimal profile is characterised by lower 
renewal fees until age 14 and then a sharp increase to reach a final renewal fee that amounts 
to six times the current one. Exact values of renewal fees at each date are reported in Table 2. 
The optimal “one profile fits all” renewal fees let the expected option value of patents 
unchanged but yield an expected social cost of 59881.80 Euros per patent which is 127.1 
Euros less than the current expected social cost. Conversely, the expected discounted sum of 
renewal fees paid to the patent office falls to 238.972 Euros per patent, which is less than half 
the value estimated for the current profile. Table 3 displays detailed simulation results for the 
option value, social cost for consumers and revenues raised by the patent office by class of 
patent. A detailed examination of these results reveals an important drawback of the optimal 
“one profile fits all” system of renewal fees: the expected option value of patents is let 
unchanged compared to the current system at the cost of an implicit monetary transfer from 
patents with initially high option values to patents with an initially low option value. Say 
another way, the suggested optimal “one profile fits all” system of renewal fees favours 
patents of low value compared to patents with high value. This seems rather inconsistent with 
the willingness to favour high value patents and to stop the current patent backlog to balloon 
further. 
If a revenue-generating constraint is imposed to make sure that revenues from renewal 
fees that accrue to the patent office do not fall behind their current level, the optimal profile 
becomes closer to the current one. The expected social cost of a patent then rises to 60022.40 
                                                
14
 We used Mathematica software and the instruction Minimize to solve all constrained optimisation 
programs in this paper. 
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Euros which is slightly higher than the current one. This result follows on from the fact that 
optimal profiles are constrained to be exponentially increasing or decreasing functional forms 
of the age of a patent whereas current profiles have a more flexible form. Figure 10 shows 
how the revenue-generating constraint affects the optimal solution. A third iso-curve is added 
to Figure 8 to represent all couples of initial and final renewal fees that are compatible with 
the constraint. The new constraint is steeper than the iso-curve associated with the expected 
option value so that the solution depicted in Figure 8 is located behind the constraint. The 
minimal increase of c0  and decrease of cT  required to fulfil the constraint is given by the 
crossing point between the constraint and the iso-curve for the expected option value in 
Figure 10. Again, Table 3 highlights some distributional effects of the revenue-generating 
constraint. Interestingly, the effects as regards option values are opposite to those outlined in 
the unconstrained optimal profile. The optimal profile with revenue-generating constraint 
strengthens the asymmetry between patents in favour of high value patents compared with the 
current system and a fortiori compared with the unconstrained optimal profile. There are also 
distributional effects in terms of revenues raised by the patent office in spite of the constraint 
to let expected revenues unchanged compared with the current system. Indeed, the optimal 
profile with a revenue-generating constraint is characterised by slightly higher renewal fees at 
the first ages and lower renewal fees at the last ages compared with current renewal fees. It 
thus transfers the burden of financing the patent system from high option value patents to low 
option value patents. Stated another way, there is a transfer of the burden from high to low-
quality patents where quality is assessed by the option value of patents. Indeed, patents with a 
high option value are renewed for a long period whereas patents that are withdrawn early have 
a lower option value. 
Broadly speaking, the gain in terms of social cost from implementing the optimal “one 
profile fits all” system without imposing a revenue-generating constraint is low. Moreover, 
this system induces negative distributional ancillary effects that make it of little interest 
compared with the current system. By contrast, the optimal “one profile fits all” system with a 
revenue-generating requirement does not generate any gain in terms of expected social cost 
per patent but has positive distributional ancillary effects both in terms of option value of 
patents and on the burden of financing the patent office. As a result, one may wonder whether 
it is possible to conciliate the respective advantages of the unconstrained and constrained 
profiles. A way to do so could consist in discriminating between patents ex ante by proposing 
a menu of alternative profiles. This suggestion is examined in the next section. 
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4.3. Estimation of the optimal “tailor-made profiles” renewal fees 
The optimal system of “tailor-made profiles” for renewal fees defined in (10) assumes 
that one profile is determined for each class of patent. However, several problems have been 
encountered when trying to determine such an optimal system. First of all, it has not been 
possible to numerically find a solution to (10). More specifically, it seems particularly uneasy 
to find a solution that fulfils all constraints simultaneously. Secondly, when relaxing some of 
the constraints, it appears that the optimal profiles for most of the different classes of patents 
are very close. Therefore, we have finally opted for a system that involves only two different 
profiles. The first profile (profile A) is intended to be chosen by applicants if their patents 
belong to the first two classes of patents, those with the lowest initial market size. The second 
profile (profile B) is intended to be chosen by all other applicants. Program (10) has to be 
modified in accordance. There are now one Pareto improvement constraint (10.b) and one 
incentive compatibility constraint (10.c) for each class of patent. The Pareto improvement 
constraint states that the option value of a patent with the profile of renewal fees specially 
designed for its class is at least as high as its option value with the current system of renewal 
fees. At worst, the monetary incentives to innovate are thus let unchanged. The incentive 
compatibility constraint states that the value of a patented invention is higher with profile A 
than with profile B if the patent belongs to class 1 or class 2 and conversely if the patent 
belongs to other classes. As in the previous section, the analysis is restrained to the case of 
exponentially increasing or decreasing profiles for renewal fees. The expected social cost in 
(10.a) has thus to be minimised with respect to the initial and final renewal fees cA0  and c
A
T
characterising profile A and the initial and final renewal fees cB0  and c
B
T  characterising profile 
B. 
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The solution for profile A and profile B are illustrated by Figure 11. The detailed 
renewal fees are reported in Table 4. Again, we consider both the case with and without a 
revenue-generating constraint. In each case, the general shape of profile A is close to that of 
the optimal “one profile fits all” system obtained in the previous section, except that renewal 
fees at the last ages are systematically higher. Unsurprisingly, profile A is thus clearly 
designed to encourage patent applications for inventions with initially low market size but, in 
counterparts, it imposes high renewal fees in case of success. Profile B without a revenue-
generating requirement is almost similar to the current profile of renewal fees. This profile 
imposes higher renewal fees than profile A at the first ages but compensates by lower renewal 
fees at the last ages. For this reason, it is expected to be chosen by applicants whose patents 
belong to classes 3 to 11, i.e. patents with a sufficiently high initial market size to justify the 
payment of renewal fees for a long period. The decrease of renewal fees characterising profile 
B with a revenue-generating constraint is more surprising. Nonetheless, the impact of the 
revenue-generating constraint on profile B is in line with the impact already observed for 
profile A and for the optimal “one profile fits all” system examined in section 4.2. Indeed, the 
revenue-generating constraint systematically flattens the profiles of renewal fees and 
increases initial renewal fees in counterpart. The impact of the constraint on profile B 
corresponds to an extreme version of this tendency. The resulting profile may be interpreted 
as a profile which is essentially intended to act as an application fee. Indeed, due to the 
exponential functional form used for the profile, it is not possible to obtain a system of 
application fees only but it is possible to approximate such a system by imposing decreasing 
renewal fees. Simulation results thus suggest that setting application fees to zero or at a low 
level and imposing increasing renewal fees is relevant for patents characterised by 
unfavourable initial conditions (i.e. low initial market size) whereas a system of application 
fees without renewal fees may be preferred for patents characterised by favourable initial 
conditions. 
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There is little to gain to expect from the optimal “tailor-made profiles” system 
compared to the optimal “one profile fits all” system in terms of expected option value, 
expected social cost and expected discounted sum of fees paid per patent when examined 
across all classes of patents. Indeed, there is a slight increase of both the expected option 
value and the expected revenue perceived per patent whereas the expected social cost per 
patent is very close to that obtained with the current system. Nevertheless, there are 
interesting distributional effects between classes of patents. Table 3 gives detailed results on 
the option value, social cost for consumers and revenues perceived per patent and by class of 
patent with profiles A and B. A comparison of option values with those obtained with current 
renewal fees helps identifying for which classes of patents the Pareto improvement constraint 
(10.b) is binding. The expected option value per patent obtained with the “tailor-made 
profiles” mechanism is equal to the expected option value per patent obtained with the current 
profile for class 2 (with profile A) and class 4 (with profile B) in the absence of a revenue-
generating constraint and class 2 (with profile A) and class 3 (with profile B) when a revenue-
generating constraint is imposed. All other classes have a net gain in terms of patent’s option 
value whether a revenue-generating requirement is imposed or not. More interestingly, the 
corresponding increase of the monetary incentive to innovate compared to the current system 
is higher for classes 5 to 11 when a revenue-generating constraint is imposed. Hence, the 
constraint does not affect the incentive to innovate for patented inventions with a high initial 
market size. Conversely, it lowers the monetary incentive to innovate for patented inventions 
with initially low market size, i.e. for patents belonging to class 1. Broadly speaking, similar 
tendencies are observed in terms of expected discounted sum of fees paid per patent: the 
revenue-generating constraint lowers the amount paid for patented inventions with an initially 
high market size and increases the amount paid for those with an initially low market size 
compared to both the optimal “tailor-made profiles” system with no revenue-generating 
requirement and the current system of renewal fees
15
. There are no important changes in terms 
of the social cost per patent observed by class of patents between the optimal “one profile fits 
all” system, the optimal “tailor-made profiles” system and the current system. 
                                                
15
 The evolution class by class is less smooth than the one observed for the option value or the social cost. 
A reason for this may be that, contrary to the option value or the social cost per patent, revenues generated by
renewal fees do not depend on the stochastic rent and may therefore be subject to some threshold effects. 
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6. Concluding Remarks 
Since the early 1980s, patent policy in most industrialised countries has been 
strengthened, broadened and extended to areas where earlier patenting was relatively low. A 
consequence of these reforms is that there is an increasing debate on how to improve patent 
quality and on the ways to reduce the backlog of most patent offices. The main difficulty in 
fixing the problems with the patent system is that by doing so, we need to preserve the 
essential innovation incentives which patent property rights were originally designed to 
provide and to formulate reforms that recognize the informational limitations under which 
patent offices will inevitably operate. Among the suggested directions for reform, a change in 
the profile of patent renewal fees is of particular importance. However, the main barrier to this 
reform is that patent offices in a variety of countries are self-financed and are therefore facing 
a revenue constraint which requires them to raise funds. If a patent office seeks to raise 
revenue, then it will not in general set the socially optimal schedule of patent renewal fees and 
may have an incentive to encourage too many patent renewals from a social point of view. 
Considering this constraint, the main objective of this article was to use renewal fees to 
improve the efficiency of the innovation incentives generated by the patent system and 
therefore to study alternative renewal fee structures to determinate the optimal renewal fees 
profile. The econometric analysis yields two important results. First, it is not possible to 
reduce the deadweight loss without reducing the incentive to innovate. This is a problem as 
such as the estimated expected social cost of a patent is more that ten times the estimated 
value of the expected option value of a patent. The burden of the charge borne by society to 
give monetary incentives to private inventors to patent their inventions and diffuse knowledge 
is thus quite consequent. We should hence consider the social costs of the patenting system as 
well as its advantages in order to guide decisions. Second, there is room for an improvement 
of the renewal fee structure if one adds some criteria of quality to the social cost. Indeed, for a 
given incentive to innovate and for a same social cost, a menu of profile rather than a “one 
profile fits all” system could increase the asymmetry between patents in terms of option value 
and, by doing so, it would clearly encompass a quality premium. 
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Figure 1
Tree form representation of the stochastic process for the number of 
positive shocks affecting market size 
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Figure 2
Observed profiles of renewal fees at different dates (in constant 2000 
euros) 
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Figure 3
Average Frequencies of withdrawals by age (cohorts 1970-1986) 
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Figure 4
Observed (continuous line) and predicted (dashed line) average 
frequencies of withdrawals by age (cohorts 1970-2006) 
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Figure 5
Observed (continuous line) and predicted (dashed line) frequencies of 
withdrawals by age (cohorts 1986) 
5 10 15 20
age
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
frequency
38
Figure 6
Expected social cost (in Euros) of a patent as a function of the initial 
and final renewal fees 
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Figure 7
Expected option value (in Euros) of a patent as a function of the initial 
and final renewal fees 
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Figure 8
Iso-curves for the expected option value (continuous line) and 
expected social cost (dashed line) of a patent at the corner solution for 
the optimal “one profile fits all” system. 
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Figure 9
Current renewal fees (points) and optimal “one profile fits all” 
renewal fees (continuous line) 
a) without revenue-generating requirement 
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Figure 10
Iso-curve for the expected option value (slim continuous line), iso-
curve for the expected social cost (dashed line) of a patent and 
revenue-generating constraint (thick continuous line) at the solution 
for the optimal “one profile fits all” system with a revenue-generating 
constraint. 
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Figure 11
Current renewal fees (points), optimal profile A for the first two 
classes of patents (continuous line) and optimal profile B for other 
classes of patents (dashed line) 
a) without revenue-generating requirement 
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Table 1: estimated coefficients (cohorts 1970 to 2004) 
 coefficient Log likelihood ratio statistic 
h∆ 0.37477 477578.42 
α 0.542073 1.1006657106
β 2.1540110-6 37105.65 
δ min 0.63837 44347.18 
δ max 0.22226 8054.90 
λ 0.0163875 39278.29 
µ S0 101153 97402.87 
σ S0 121275 74099.63 
Likelihood 9.8844249910
-924031
Mean Square Error 0.345986 
Expected option value of a patent 
(in Euros) 
5767.76 
Expected social cost of a patent 
(in Euros) 
60008.9 
Expected revenues of the patent 
office from a patent (in Euros) 
520.262 
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Table 2: Comparison of renewal fees (in Euros) with the current 
system and the optimal “one profile fits all” system 
 Current renewal fee 
Optimal “one 
profile fits all” 
renewal fee 
Optimal “one 
profile fits all” 
renewal fee with a 
revenue-generating 
requirement 
Age 0 53.4894 1. 38.5463 
Age 1 28.8843 1.54088 44.0894 
Age 2 31.0239 2.37432 50.4296 
Age 3 33.1635 3.65855 57.6817 
Age 4 43.8613 5.63739 65.9765 
Age 5 57.7686 8.68656 75.4643 
Age 6 77.0248 13.385 86.3164 
Age 7 103.77 20.6247 98.7291 
Age 8 136.933 31.7802 112.927 
Age 9 166.887 48.9696 129.166 
Age 10 212.888 75.4564 147.741 
Age 11 249.261 116.269 168.987 
Age 12 295.262 179.158 193.288 
Age 13 332.704 276.061 221.083 
Age 14 369.077 425.377 252.876 
Age 15 430.055 655.457 289.241 
Age 16 469.637 1009.98 330.835 
Age 17 514.568 1556.26 378.411 
Age 18 571.267 2398.02 432.828 
Age 19 647.222 3695.07 495.07 
4
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Table 4: Comparison of renewal fees (in Euros) with the current system and the 
optimal “tailor-made profiles” system 
Current 
renewal fee 
Optimal “tailor-made profile” 
renewal fee 
Optimal “tailor-made profile” 
renewal fee with a revenue-
generating requirement 
  Profile A Profile B Profile A Profile B 
Age 0 53.4894 1.00077 30.4743 25.7315 271.047 
Age 1 28.8843 1.5768 35.8058 30.7909 235.455 
Age 2 31.0239 2.48439 42.0702 36.8451 204.536 
Age 3 33.1635 3.91437 49.4305 44.0897 177.678 
Age 4 43.8613 6.16744 58.0785 52.7587 154.346 
Age 5 57.7686 9.71735 68.2395 63.1323 134.078 
Age 6 77.0248 15.3105 80.1782 75.5456 116.472 
Age 7 103.77 24.1231 94.2057 90.3996 101.178 
Age 8 136.933 38.0081 110.687 108.174 87.8915 
Age 9 166.887 59.8851 130.052 129.444 76.3501 
Age 10 212.888 94.3542 152.805 154.895 66.3243 
Age 11 249.261 148.663 179.539 185.351 57.615 
Age 12 295.262 234.232 210.95 221.796 50.0493 
Age 13 332.704 369.054 247.857 265.406 43.4771 
Age 14 369.077 581.477 291.22 317.591 37.768 
Age 15 430.055 916.168 342.17 380.037 32.8085 
Age 16 469.637 1443.5 402.033 454.761 28.5003 
Age 17 514.568 2274.37 472.37 544.177 24.7578 
Age 18 571.267 3583.46 555.013 651.175 21.5068 
Age 19 647.222 5646.07 652.114 779.212 18.6826 
